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Taxable Income
By Arthur A. Ballantine
[The paper by George O. May, read at the annual meeting of the American
Institute of Accountants and published in The Journal of Accountancy for
October, 1925, was followed by a general discussion led by Arthur A. Ballantine.
In the following report of Mr. Ballantine’s remarks the frequent references to
statements made by Mr. May relate of course to the paper which appeared in
this magazine last month.—Editor.]

As Mr. May has branded the legal mind as suspicious of any
thing more complicated than a cash account, it is perhaps hardly
fitting that a lawyer should begin the discussion of Mr. May’s
excellent paper. At the same time, he has expressed astonish
ment at the accounting notions of economists, and so I suppose
you might as well go to a lawyer as anywhere else if you are going
outside this select group at all. As Mr. May has very graciously
added, along towards the close of his paper, that accountants
themselves are sometimes inconsistent in their phraseology, and I
might add from experience also at times a little copious in their
phraseology, perhaps I can indulge the legal passion for simplifica
tion on Mr. May’s paper. He is so convincing that I am sorry to
say that I cannot quarrel with him very extensively, but I should
like to emphasize the importance of some of the views which he
has expressed. His own moderation and suavity may belittle the
practical importance of what he says.
The effect of Mr. May’s paper ought to be to destroy a myth
which has worked a great deal of mischief in income-tax legislation
and in income-tax administration—that myth of the existence of
some one ideal system of accounting, furnishing a fixed formula by
which all accounting questions can be solved. As Mr. May has
said, that idea has been pretty well eliminated from the law itself.
His object is now to drive it from its last lurking place among the
administrative offices in the bureau of internal revenue. We
often find there even today that in accounting matters officers
tend to proceed on the basis of the country doctor who said he was
all right if he could throw the patient into fits because he was great
on fits. They are all right if they can throw the tax problem into
the basis of accrual accounting because they are great on accrual
accounting. Now, as opposed to this view of a fixed method of
accounting, I understand Mr. May to take the position that ac
counting consists in the application to complicated subject matter
of various principles which are founded upon reason and experi
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ence, among which a choice must be made. He would substitute
the rule of reason for the sway of the shibboleth.
I was impressed by Mr. May’s apt definition of income. He
has said that it would be fairly accurate to say that the general
test of the existence of income is whether there is a gain, but that
items which ordinarily constitute gain and are commonly regarded
as income, may be taxed as such, even though in exceptional cases
they may not result in gain to the recipient. He has very neatly
summed up there the effect of the decisions of the supreme court
as to the meaning and nature of income. He takes in, of course,
the leading case of Doyle and Mitchell, where it was established
that the gross proceeds of the sales are not by any means income,
but that you must first take out the original capital represented by
the subject matter of the sale. He takes in the treatment of
dividends, as dividends have been treated in the law, as being in
herently of the nature of income, notwithstanding their relations
to their particular recipients, and he also takes in the more recent
Gavit case, in which it was held, in interpreting the 1913 act,
that the proceeds of income from a trust fund given to a recipient
for life or for a period of years was of the nature of income and
taxable as such, and the claim of the recipient who had tried to set
a capital value against such receipts and make a deduction for the
recovery of that value was rejected by the court. All those views
come into Mr. May’s definition.
The decision of the matter of depletion, to which Mr. May has
referred, has left the legal status of that important matter in
some doubt. I think that doubt exists largely because of the way
in which the matter of the depletion deduction has been presented
to the supreme court. In the original case of Stratton’s Inde
pendence, which arose under the 1909 act, the excise-tax act, as
Mr. May said, the company contended that it was entitled to
subtract from the gross proceeds of the mineral product the en
tire excess of those proceeds over the cost of the mining operation,
with the result, of course, that there was no profit from the opera
tion at all, and that the entire result from the sales over the ex
penses was to be treated as a return of capital. Now, the only
question presented to the court in this case was whether that
particular deduction was authorized. The court had no alterna
tive to say what would have been a correct deduction from the
gross income, if any were in order, and carefully pointed that out.
In the succeeding case of Stanton & Balte Mining Company,
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which arose under the 1913 act, the true income-tax act, the com
pany again in effect took the position that the entire proceeds
from mining were exempt from the tax, and did not present a view
as to what might be a reasonable deduction for a return of capital
from the mining operation. The taxpayer was, of course, object
ing to the arbitrary limitation in the act of the depletion allowance
to 5% of the gross proceeds, but did not present a view as to what
a really proper deduction might be, which might admit of a profit
in a mining operation. In that instance the court followed the
Stratton Independence case, even though that case was decided
under the excise-tax act. I do think that that decision in itself,
the Stanton & Balte Mining Company, seems to indicate on its
face that, following English decisions, the court would have sus
tained the act even though a reasonable deduction for depletion
was actually shown on the record to be in excess of the 5% limita
tion. Such a result would be inconsistent, as Mr. May has in
dicated, with the view which the supreme court has generally
taken, that income is essentially gain. It was inconsistent with
the result in Doyle and Mitchell and therefore I think and hope
that we should find, if the question of a proper and reasonable
depletion were presented, that the court would hold that in case of
the operation of a mine, there must be an allowance for a return of
capital as much as in the case of the timber companies. With
that exception, which Mr. May noted, the supreme court has cer
tainly sustained the view that income is in the nature of gain.
Now we come to Mr. May’s statement of how we are to get at
the gain, and there he makes the proposition which undoubtedly
is very obvious to accountants but has not seemed so obvious to
taxpayers at times or to the bureau, that gain is the result of the
difference between two sides of correctly kept accounts. In com
mercial operations it is not to be computed item by item. He
points out that the question of what goes into those two sides is a
matter involving judgment, discretion, the use of experience, and
that being true as to the two sides of the account, the result as to
what is gain is necessarily a matter of judgment. He further
points out that particularly in the case of industries where the re
sults of operations extend through more than one year, the ques
tion of allocating items entering into one side of the account or the
other to a particular year is a matter of judgment, and not a matter
of absolute logical demonstration, and the judgment must be
exercised with reference to the exigencies and the nature of the
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particular business which is involved. If those views as to the
nature of gain and the way of getting at it are accepted in incometax administration, it follows that the discussion of the status of
any particular practice and the solution of any particular problem
depends on consideration of that particular problem and getting
at what is the result to be accepted as reflecting the business truth
in the light of the experience of business men and not a matter of
resorting to any formula or any a priori notion of what the result
ought to be. I am sure that it is a result with which all are in
accord, and that endorsement of that view will help in the solution
of tax problems.
Mr. May’s observation that there is a fundamental distinction
between the determination of what deductions from income are
authorized and the determination of what constitutes gross
income seems to me of much importance. We find traces, as indi
cated, of the view in the bureau that in getting at what constitutes
gross income, there may be deductions which do not fall within the
express provisions for deduction in the act, but the fact has not
been broadly and clearly recognized that the determination of
gross income and the determination of authorized deduction from
gross income is a fundamental accounting notion. An illustration
of that, although not in the field of commercial income to which
Mr. May has devoted his discussion, came up to me a short time
ago in the case of a trust. A very large trust was left and a pro
vision was made in the will which created the trust for the pay
ment of fixed amounts to the trustees. Those fixed amounts were
very small. The small amounts fixed in the will might have been
well enough while the original trustees, who were friends of the
testator, were operating the trust, as they would do it as a matter
of friendship, but as that time got further back, and as the trustees
changed, it was obvious that in order to get proper administration
of the trust the beneficiary would have to pay very much larger
compensation to the trustees. The beneficiary therefore entered
into a contract with the trustees under which it was provided that
if the trustees would continue to act, the beneficiary would make
very substantial additional payments. Those payments were
finally made and deducted from the income returns of the bene
ficiary. The bureau so far has taken the view that those deduc
tions made by the beneficiaries were not authorized because they
could be authorized only if the beneficiary was carrying on a busi
ness and they were business deductions. The beneficiary was
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stated not to be carrying on a business and therefore it was con
cluded that there was no provision for deductions of that sort.
The contention was made in behalf of the taxpayers that the busi
ness was being carried on by the trustees for the account of the
beneficiary, but beyond that it was contended that the tax rests
upon the income of the beneficiary, and the gross income of the
beneficiary is the amount received less expenses necessarily in
curred in the realization of the income, and on that principle
which Mr. May has here pointed out those deductions are allowable
by the act. I am glad to find that Mr. May’s principle so firmly
supports the position which was taken in this particular case.
Mr. May has said something about the attitude and principles
to be adopted in solving the tax problem and has expressed the
idea that the deductions which are to be permitted to taxpayers,
following the general accounting basis as he has indicated, cannot
be such as to rest simply upon the discretion of the taxpayer. He
has said that in a determination of income for general purposes,
principles of conservatism are to be followed in not recognizing
any item of gross income until it is an actual realization or what is
expected in all reasonable probability to be a realization; that
business men must also provide for losses which are foreseen even
in advance of the realization of those losses if they are to tell them
selves a true and proper story of the result of the business as it
goes along; but he has pointed out that the revenue officers and
congress could hardly be expected to permit deductions which
must rest solely upon the discretion of the particular taxpayer.
That, of course, has been a point of controversy in the bureau. It
was of the greatest importance to taxpayers that the ruling was
established in 1917 that inventories could be taken on the basis of
cost or market, whichever was lower. That meant that where the
inventory was less than cost, the taxpayer was taking an antici
pated loss, not a realized loss; he might never realize that loss but
he was nevertheless permitted to take it. That was permitted
because it was an established practice of conservatism, but there
was also another consideration which entered into the recognition
of that practice. That consideration was that the determination
of the amount of loss to be taken could be made irrespective of the
judgment of that particular taxpayer. The probable loss allowed
to be taken was based upon the difference between cost and actual
market prices. Taxpayers constantly urged upon the bureau
that where the taxpayer, a business man, in his judgment foresaw
353
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that the cost of goods was going down below the current market at
the end of the year, he ought to be able to take an allowance for
that expected loss. The bureau has never acceded to that view,
but has limited the anticipated loss to a loss that can be measured
by some standard external to the judgment of the particular tax
payer. It seems to me that congress must continue and the bureau
must continue to adhere to that standard, as otherwise the taxpayer
could determine in his own discretion when and whether he would
pay his tax. That would seem to be a fitting subject for discussion.
The historical portion of Mr. May’s paper I think is of very
distinct help in understanding the development of the income-tax
law. He points out that the 1909 excise-tax act took what is
referred to as the “received and paid” basis for the determination
of income. I do not think it is wholly fair to wish that on the
lawyers. I think that was rather the ordinary layman’s idea of how
income was to be determined. The problem presented in adopt
ing such a mechanical law as that, a law so far away from recog
nized commercial practice, was solved, as Mr. May indicated,
with the help of accountants. I suspect his own hand was felt in
the Gilbertian interpretation which saved that law. That inter
pretation did tend to leave people confused as to what the law
meant when it was capable in some instances of such flexibility of
interpretation while rigid in other respects, but the precedent of
those Gilbertian regulations in 1909 was of enormous importance
to taxpayers in dealing with the excess-profits law of 1917. The
operation that had to be performed on the 1917 excess-profits law
to get a reasonable and approximately just application of that act
to the varying conditions of business, was far more drastic than
the operation which had to be performed on the 1909 law. The
light Gilbertian operation of 1909 was a very helpful precedent for
the Caesarian operation of 1917 and 1918.
As Mr. May says, the problem of getting a recognition in the
statute itself of the use of a proper accounting basis is solved. It
was solved also partly with the help of the despised lawyers. The
problem now is as to the mind of the bureau, that is to a very
considerable extent an accounting mind, and I am very hopeful
that, with such weighty counsel as Mr. May has now given, the
last difficulty will be removed. I am sure it will be most helpful
in accomplishing that result if this distinguished and authoritative
association sees fit to enforce and endorse the views which have
been so well expressed by Mr. May.
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